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The following information has been given to each member of the House
Judicary Committee and was placed on the Internet in electronic form
by Bill Hamilton of Inslaw Corporation.  The complete document with
supporting details may be obtained from:

    Inslaw
    1125 15th Street, NW
    Washington, DC 20005-2707
    Telephone [phone]

                              ______________


                             EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

     Eleven years ago, the Justice Department's PROMIS Project
Manager arranged for an Israeli Government official to visit INSLAW
for a PROMIS briefing and demonstration.  The Justice Department told
INSLAW that the visitor was a prosecuting attorney from the Israeli
Ministry of Justice who would be overseeing a project to computerize
the public prosecution offices in Israel.

     Three months after the visit, the Justice Department secretly
turned over to a representative of the Israeli Government a copy of
the PROMIS software, according to a contemporaneous internal Justice
Department memorandum made public by the House Judiciary Committee in
its September 1992 Investigative Report, The INSLAW Affair.

     INSLAW followed up on this disclosure by the House Judiciary
Committee by contacting the Israeli Ministry of Justice in Tel Aviv
about the "prosecuting attorney" who had visited INSLAW ten years
earlier in February 1983.  After obtaining information from the
Ministry about the current location of the prosecuting attorney,
INSLAW consulted with two journalists in Tel Aviv.  One journalist
interviewed the now-retired prosecuting attorney at his home in
Jerusalem.  The prosecuting attorney bore no resemblance to the
visitor to INSLAW and was unfamiliar with some important aspects of
the visit to INSLAW, although he claimed to have been the February
1983 Israeli visitor to INSLAW.  The other journalist told INSLAW
that the prosecuting attorney's name has been used in the past as a
pseudonym for Rafi Eitan, a legendary Israeli intelligence official.


     INSLAW employees who had met with the Israeli visitor in
February 1983 attempted to identify the visitor from a police-style
photographic line-up.  The process was videotaped in the studio of a
national television network.  The photographic line-up confirmed that
the visitor to INSLAW was neither a prosecutor nor an attorney, but
Rafi Eitan.  At the time of the visit to INSLAW, Rafi Eitan was
Director of LAKAM, a super-secret agency in the Israeli Ministry of
Defense responsible for collecting scientific and technical
intelligence information from other countries through espionage.
Rafi Eitan became well known in the United States, several years
after his visit to INSLAW, when Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. Navy
civilian intelligence analyst, was arrested and charged with spying
for Rafi Eitan and Israeli intelligence.

     During the interim between Rafi Eitan's visit to INSLAW and the
delivery of a copy of PROMIS to an Israeli official, the Government's
PROMIS Project Manager and others in the Justice Department pressured
INSLAW to deliver to the Justice Department, without any protection
for INSLAW's property rights, the proprietary version of PROMIS that
was not required to be delivered under INSLAW's PROMIS Implementation
Contract.

     The particular proprietary version of PROMIS that was the object
of this Justice Department pressure was the version that INSLAW had
demonstrated to the Israeli Government visitor and that operates on a
VAX computer.  INSLAW was operating this proprietary version of
PROMIS on a computer at INSLAW's offices and using it to support each
of the 10 largest U.S. Attorneys' Offices, via telephone lines.
Under its three-year contract, INSLAW was to provide this PROMIS
computer time-sharing service on an interim basis until each of the
U.S.  Attorneys' Offices acquired its own computer, and INSLAW
thereafter was to install an earlier, public domain version of PROMIS
on those computers.

     The Justice Department explained this pressure to obtain
immediate delivery of a copy of the proprietary VAX version of PROMIS
by a suddenly-professed concern about INSLAW's financial viability.
In response to this professed concern, INSLAW offered to place a copy
of the VAX version of PROMIS in escrow in a local bank; that would
have been the accepted industry remedy for the professed problem.
The Justice Department, however, rejected INSLAW's escrow offer and
insisted on immediately obtaining physical custody of a copy of the
proprietary VAX version of PROMIS.

     The Justice Department eventually accomplished its objective of
physical custody of a copy of the VAX version of PROMIS through a
bilateral modification to the contract in which the Government
committed itself, inter alia, not to disseminate the proprietary
version of PROMIS outside the U.S. Attorneys' Offices.  This was the
April 11, 1983 Modification #12 to the PROMIS Implementation
Contract.  None of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices had a VAX computer,
without which it is impossible to use a VAX version of PROMIS.

     Two lower federal courts found that the Justice Department
entered into Modification #12 in order to "steal" the proprietary
version of PROMIS "through trickery, fraud and deceit." The House
Judiciary Committee independently confirmed those findings in the
course of a three- year-long investigation.

     Rafi Eitan emerged again in the INSLAW affair in 1986 when
INSLAW filed a lawsuit against the Justice Department over the theft
of the PROMIS software.  INSLAW's lead litigation counsel was fired
by his law firm amid secret communications between the law firm and
the two highest officials of the U.S. Justice Department.  The
Attorney General stated under oath and the Deputy Attorney General
claimed to the Senate that the secret discussions were about the
INSLAW case; the law firm claimed to the press that the secret
discussions were about its concurrent representation in the Jonathan
Pollard-Rafi Eitan espionage case.

     In May 1986, three years to the month after the Justice
Department secretly turned over a copy of PROMIS to an Israeli
Government official, INSLAW and senior partners in the law firm that
was then serving as INSLAW's litigation counsel reviewed a complaint,
drafted by INSLAW's lead counsel, for the lawsuit against the Justice
Department about the theft of the proprietary version of PROMIS.  The
complaint contained over 50 references to Jensen; included was a
23-paragraph section that described the "personal involvement" of
then Deputy Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen in the INSLAW affair,
beginning with Jensen's tenure as Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division during the first several years of the Reagan
Administration.  The law firm immediately rejected the complaint that
had been drafted by the lead counsel and set about to redraft the
complaint in its entirety, assigning two additional lawyers to the
INSLAW case for that purpose.  These lawyers soon produced a new
complaint that omitted every reference to the role of D. Lowell
Jensen.  Prior to the filing of the revised complaint in U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, the lead counsel inserted, at INSLAW's insistence,
a single parenthetical reference to Jensen's role.

     In October 1986, three months after INSLAW filed its lawsuit,
the law firm fired INSLAW's lead counsel who had by then been a
partner in the firm for 10 years.  The lead counsel told INSLAW at
the time that he had been fired for naming Jensen in the complaint.
He also told INSLAW at the time that the Managing Partner had stated
that Senior Partner Leonard Garment had instigated the firing.

     On October 6, 1986, one week before Leonard Garment and the
other members of the law firm's Senior Policy Committee met to vote
on the decision to expel INSLAW's lead counsel from the firm, Garment
had a social luncheon regarding INSLAW with Deputy Attorney General
Arnold Burns.  Garment never disclosed this fact either to INSLAW's
lead counsel or to INSLAW.  Burns had succeeded Jensen as Deputy
Attorney General in the summer of 1986 when Jensen left the Justice
Department to become a U.S. District Court Judge in San Francisco.
During the luncheon, Burns complained to Garment about the litigation
strategy that INSLAW's lead counsel was pursuing in its lawsuit
against the Department and signalled to Garment his willingness to
discuss a settlement, according to Burns' later disclosures to the
Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee.  Attorney General Meese
also talked to Garment in October 1986 about INSLAW and about
Garment's conversation with Burns relating to INSLAW, according to
later sworn Justice Department responses to INSLAW interrogatories.

     In early 1988, in statements to the press, Garment disclaimed
any recollection of a discussion about INSLAW with Deputy Attorney
General Burns and insisted that his October 1986 discussion with
Attorney General Meese had been about Israel, not INSLAW.  Moreover,
Garment elaborated on this claim, reportedly telling at least one
journalist that it was a discussion of a "back channel" communication
that Garment had had with the Government of Israel about the Pollard
case, which Garment described to the journalist as a national
security problem affecting both Israel and the U.S. Justice
Department.

     The Israeli Government had retained Garment in an effort to
prevent the indictment by the U.S. Justice Department of other
Israeli officials involved in the Pollard espionage scandal. The
central role of Rafi Eitan and Israeli intelligence in both the
INSLAW affair and the Pollard espionage scandal may account for why
Meese and Burns characterized the October 1986 discussions with
Garment as having to do with INSLAW, while Garment insisted they were
really about a national security problem of concern to both Israel
and the U.S. Justice Department.

     When Garment's law firm fired INSLAW's lead counsel, it agreed
to make severance payments to him in excess of half-a-million dollars
and contractually bound him to secrecy about the severance.  Soon
after firing INSLAW's lead counsel, the law firm, which had, by then,
been representing INSLAW for almost a year, suddenly claimed to have
discovered fatal deficiencies in the evidence available to prove the
Justice Department's 1983 theft of PROMIS. The law firm presented
INSLAW with a written ultimatum to concede to the Justice Department
on that question or find new litigation counsel.  INSLAW found new
litigation counsel and proved in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and the
U.S. District Court that the Justice Department had stolen the PROMIS
software in 1983.

     A former Israeli intelligence official, Ari Ben Menashe,
published a book in the fall of 1992 entitled Profits of War, that
contains specific claims about Rafi Eitan and the PROMIS software,
many of which are plausible in view of the aforementioned facts.
According to the author, a high-ranking member of the White House
National Security Council staff was personally involved in the
delivery of a copy of the proprietary version of PROMIS to Rafi Eitan
during a visit by Rafi Eitan to Washington, DC in the early 1980's.
Robert McFarlane, who during the relevant period was Deputy National
Security Advisor to President Ronald Reagan, and Earl W. Brian, a
private businessman who had been a member of the California cabinet
of Governor Ronald Reagan, secretly presented INSLAW's proprietary
software to Rafi Eitan, according to the author.

     The objective of the alleged White House gift of INSLAW's
software to Rafi Eitan and Israeli intelligence was for Israeli
intelligence, through sales conducted by cutout companies, to
disseminate PROMIS to foreign intelligence agencies, law enforcement
agencies, and international commercial banks so that PROMIS could
function in those target organizations as an electronic Trojan horse
for Allied signal intelligence agencies, according to the author.

     Among the individuals whose companies served as cutouts for the
illegal dissemination of PROMIS by Israeli intelligence, according to
the author, were Earl W. Brian and the late British publisher, Robert
Maxwell.  Earl W. Brian, for example, allegedly sold the proprietary
version of PROMIS to Jordanian military intelligence, so that Israeli
signal intelligence could surreptitiously access the computerized
Jordanian dossiers on Palestinians.

     When INSLAW sought redress in the federal courts in 1986 for the
Justice Department's 1983 theft of PROMIS, Israeli intelligence
intervened to obstruct justice, according to the author. While
employed in Tel Aviv by Israeli military intelligence, Ben Menashe
claims to have seen a wire transfer of $600,000 to Earl W. Brian for
use in financing a severance agreement between INSLAW's fired lead
counsel and his law firm.  Rafi Eitan drew the funds from a slush
fund jointly administered by U.S. and Israeli intelligence, and Earl
W. Brian was, in turn, to relay the money to Leonard Garment,
according to the author.

     In a meeting at the Justice Department on December 16, 1993,
INSLAW presented a sensitive document, authored by a self-evidently
credible person, offering, under appropriate circumstances, to make
available evidence corroborative of significant elements of Ben
Menashe's published claims.

     Another aspect of the role of Israeli intelligence in the INSLAW
affair is its alleged use of Robert Maxwell as a cutout.  Maxwell's
role as a cutout for a foreign nation's sale of computer software has
been implicitly acknowledged by the actions of the FBI.  Robert
Maxwell's dissemination of computer software was the subject of an
FBI foreign counterintelligence investigation in 1984.  Ten years
later, in January 1994, INSLAW obtained, under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), 18 pages relating to an investigation on this
subject in New Mexico in June 1984.  The FBI furnished the documents
to INSLAW in response to a FOIA request for documents relating to
Maxwell's involvement in "the dissemination, marketing or sale of
computer software systems, including but not limited to the PROMIS
computer software product, between 1983 and 1992."  The FBI heavily
redacted the 18 pages and ascribed the redactions to the secrecy
requirements of national security.  One month before the FBI released
the documents to INSLAW, it partially reclassified two of the pages
that had been officially declassified in their entirety one year
earlier.  The FBI redacted the newly reclassified portions in the
copies given to INSLAW.

     Robert Maxwell also developed a business relationship during the
latter half of the 1980's with two computer systems executives from
the Meese Justice Department, at least one of whom had
responsibilities relating to the proprietary version of PROMIS.
Robert Maxwell set up a tiny publishing company in McLean, Virginia,
in August 1985.  That company then hired two senior computer systems
executives from a unit of the Meese Justice Department that operated
the proprietary version of PROMIS.  One was the Director of the
Justice Data Center, the Justice Department's own internal computer
time-sharing facility where the proprietary IBM version of PROMIS was
operating for one of the legal divisions under license from INSLAW.
The Director of the Justice Data Center resigned his estimated
$90,000-a-year Senior Executive Service position to become Vice
President for Technical Services at the six-employee start-up
national defense publishing company owned by Robert Maxwell.

     In piecing together the puzzle of the Government's theft of the
proprietary version of PROMIS from INSLAW, we have noted the role of
the Government's PROMIS Project Manger in sending Rafi Eitan to
INSLAW under false pretenses and the alleged role of a senior White
House National Security official in giving the proprietary version of
PROMIS to Rafi Eitan. The missing piece to the puzzle appears to be
the piece that links the actions of the Justice Department's PROMIS
Project Manager with the alleged actions of the senior White House
National Security official.  Based on the available evidence, the
missing piece appears to be D.  Lowell Jensen, who was Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division at the time of the theft.

     Jensen pre-approved virtually every decision taken by the
Government's PROMIS Project Manager under INSLAW's contract,
according to the latter's sworn testimony to the House Judiciary
Committee.  Jensen engineered INSLAW's problems with the Justice
Department through specified top Criminal Division aides in order to
give the PROMIS business to unidentified "friends," according to
Justice Department officials whose statements and backgrounds INSLAW
summarized in its July 11, 1993 rebuttal.

     At the time of the 1983 theft, Jensen in the Criminal Division
and Edwin Meese at the White House were planning to award a massive
sweetheart contract to unidentified "friends" for the installation of
PROMIS in every litigative office of the Justice Department,
according to statements made in June 1983 by a Justice Department
whistleblower to the staff of a Senator on the Judiciary Committee.
The award was allegedly to take place once Meese left the White House
to become Attorney General. Jensen and Meese had been close friends
since the 1960's when they served together in the Alameda County,
California, District Attorney's Office.

     INSLAW has repeatedly given the Justice Department the names of
senior Criminal Division officials under Jensen who either allegedly
helped him implement the malfeasance against INSLAW or who allegedly
witnessed it.  On more than one occasion, INSLAW summarized for the
Justice Department the circumstantial evidence that is at least
partially corroborative of these allegations.  Based on warnings from
confidential informants in the Justice Department, INSLAW has
repeatedly emphasized to the Justice Department the absolute
necessity of placing these officials under oath before interrogating
them, as well as the importance of a public statement by the Attorney
General guaranteeing no reprisals.  More than five years have elapsed
since INSLAW began furnishing this information to the Justice
Department.  Not one of these Criminal Division officials has, it
appears, ever been interrogated under oath regarding the INSLAW
affair.  And no Attorney General has seen fit to issue a public
statement to Justice Department employees making it clear that the
Attorney General wishes employees who have information about the
INSLAW affair to come forward, and giving Justice Department
employees the public assurance that reprisals will not be tolerated.

     One of the senior Criminal Division officials who allegedly
knows the whole story of Jensen's malfeasance against INSLAW is Mark
Richard, the career Deputy Assistant Attorney General who has
responsibility for intelligence and national security matters.  In
May 1988, the Chief Investigator of the Senate Judiciary Committee
told INSLAW that a trusted source, who was in a position to observe
Jensen's malfeasance, had identified Mark Richard as someone who not
only knew the whole story but who was also "pretty upset" about it.

     One of the organizational units that reports to Mark Richard is
the Office of Special Investigations (OSI).  OSI's publicly-declared
mission is to locate and deport Nazi war criminals. The Nazi war
criminal program is, however, a front for the Justice Department's
own covert intelligence service, according to disclosures recently
made to INSLAW by several senior Justice Department career officials.

     One undeclared mission of this covert intelligence service has
been the illegal dissemination of the proprietary version of PROMIS,
according to information from reliable sources with ties to the U.S.
intelligence community.  INSLAW has, moreover, obtained a copy of a
27-page Justice Department computer printout, labelled "Criminal
Division Vendor List." That list is actually a list of the commercial
organizations and individuals who serve as "cutouts" for this secret
Justice Department intelligence agency, according to intelligence
community informants and a preliminary analysis of the computerized
list.  A significant proportion of the 100-plus companies on the list
appear to be in the computer industry.  The Justice Department's
secret intelligence agency also has its own "proprietary" company
that employs scores of agents of diverse nationalities, as well as
individuals who appear to be regular employees of various departments
and agencies of the U.S. Government or members of the U.S. Armed
Forces, according to several sources.

     According to written statements of which INSLAW has obtained
copies, another undeclared mission of the Justice Department's covert
agents was to insure that investigative journalist Danny Casolaro
remained silent about the role of the Justice Department in the
INSLAW scandal by murdering him in West Virginia in August 1991.
INSLAW has acquired copies of two relevant written statements
furnished to a veteran investigative journalist by a national
security operative of the U.S. Government, several months after
Casolaro's death.  The individual who reportedly transmitted these
written statements to the journalist by fax has testified under oath
to being a national security operative for the FBI and the CIA.
Partial corroboration for his claimed work for the FBI is reportedly
available in the sworn testimony of several FBI agents during a
recent criminal prosecution.  One statement purportedly reflects the
operative's personal knowledge and belief that Casolaro was killed by
agents of the Justice Department and is allegedly written in the
operative's own hand.  The other statement is an excerpt from a
typewritten set of questions and answers.  The questions were posed
to a senior CIA official by the investigative journalist; the
answers, purportedly from the senior CIA official, were reportedly
sent by fax to the journalist by the national security operative, who
was acting as an intermediary.  The following is the pertinent
question and answer:

     Q.  Do you have any information for [San Francisco-based
investigative journalist] George Williamson yet regarding the Danny
Casolaro matter?

     A.   Yes.  Casolaro appears to have been working as a free lance writer
          at the time of his death and was gathering material for a book.  He
          was investigating the INSLAW case.  He was on the trail of
          information that could have made the whole matter public and led
          to the exposure of the Justice Department and their involvement in
          the matter.  Apparently he was very close to obtaining that
          information.

          We do not agree with the consensus of opinion among the
          reporters who looked into the matter, that Casolaro committed
          suicide.  Casolaro was murdered by agents of the Justice
          Department to insure his silence.  The entire matter was handled
          internally by Justice, and our agency was not involved.

     Although these allegations are profoundly disturbing, there is
significant circumstantial evidence that bears on the plausibility of
the allegations.  As reported in INSLAW's July 11, 1993 rebuttal,
Casolaro was scheduled to have his final, follow-up meeting with two
sources on INSLAW in West Virginia the night before he died, and one
of those sources was connected to the Justice Department's PROMIS
Contracting Officer.  As reported in this addendum, the meeting
between Casolaro and those sources had allegedly been brokered by a
covert intelligence operative for the U.S. Government, an Army
Special Forces Major.  This individual appeared in Casolaro's life
during the final several weeks and introduced himself to Casolaro as
one of the closest friends of the Government's PROMIS Contracting
Officer.  Finally, during the final week of his life, Casolaro told
at least five confidants something that he had never told a single
one of them at any other time during his year-long, full-time
investigation: that he had just broken the INSLAW case.  The
preceding facts and the following information are noted in the July
11, 1993 rebuttal.  Shortly after Casolaro was found dead, the
aforementioned covert intelligence operative allegedly made the
following statement, in words or substance, to a woman who had been
present during several of his meetings with Casolaro:

     What Danny Casolaro was investigating is a business. If you don't
     want to end up like Danny or like the journalist who died a horiffic
     death in Guatemala, you'll stay out of this.  Anyone who asks too
     many questions will end up dead.

     Not all of the secret Justice Department dissemination of PROMIS
has gone through Rafi Eitan and Israeli intelligence.  For example,
in June 1983, the month after the Justice Department secretly
conveyed a copy of PROMIS to a representative of the Government of
Israel, it also, in partnership with the National Security Agency
(NSA), secretly delivered a copy of PROMIS to the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, according to a recent series of articles
in the American Banker's International Banking Regulator.  The
Justice Department and its NSA partner conveyed a copy of the
proprietary VAX version of PROMIS to the two international financial
institutions so that the NSA could electronically monitor their
operations. This is the same version of PROMIS that the Justice
Department had asked INSLAW to demonstrate to Rafi Eitan in February
1983.  As noted earlier, the Justice Department had committed itself
not to disseminate the proprietary version of PROMIS outside the U.S.
Attorneys' Offices.

     A second example is the alleged secret Justice Department
conveyance of a copy of the proprietary IBM version of PROMIS to the
CIA.  In September 1993, CIA Director R. James Woolsey told INSLAW
counsel Elliot L. Richardson that the CIA is using a PROMIS software
system that it acquired from the NSA and that is identical to the
PROMIS software that NSA uses internally and that is described on
page 80 of the Bua Report.  The application domain of the NSA's
PROMIS is the mission critical application of tracking the
intelligence information it produces.  The NSA's PROMIS operates on
an IBM mainframe computer.  This latest CIA disclosure underscores
the difficulty the CIA has had in accounting for its PROMIS.  The CIA
initially told the House Judiciary Committee in writing that it had
been unable to locate internally any PROMIS software.  Approximately
one year later, the CIA wrote again to the House Judiciary Committee,
stating that components of the CIA were operating a software system
called PROMIS but that it had purchased its PROMIS from a company in
Massachusetts. That PROMIS operates on a personal computer with
project management as the application domain.  In both written
reports, the CIA inexplicably failed to mention the PROMIS that
operates on an IBM mainframe computer at the CIA and that is critical
to the CIA's primary mission of producing intelligence information.

     The third example is the alleged Justice Department secret
dissemination of PROMIS to the NSA.  Although the NSA is quoted in
the Bua Report as claiming that it internally developed its PROMIS,
the Toronto Globe and Mail reported in May 1986 that the NSA had
purchased a PROMIS software system from a Toronto-based company.  As
shown in Exhibit A to INSLAW's July 11, 1993 rebuttal, Earl Brian's
Hadron, Inc. sold INSLAW's PROMIS to the same Toronto company in
1983, in a transaction that also allegedly involved Edwin Meese, then
Counsellor to the President.

     The final example concerns the allegation that the Justice
Department secretly distributed the proprietary VAX version of PROMIS
to the U.S. Navy for an intelligence application on board nuclear
submarines.  The Navy confirmed to a reporter for Navy Times that it
has a PROMIS software system and that it operates its PROMIS on a VAX
computer in support of its nuclear submarines.  The Navy's Undersea
Systems Center in Portsmouth, Rhode Island, furthermore, notified the
reporter in writing that its engineers had locally developed this VAX
version of PROMIS; that its PROMIS is installed only at its
land-based facility at Newport, Rhode Island; and that its PROMIS has
never been installed on board any nuclear submarine. INSLAW has,
however, obtained a document published by the same Undersea Systems
Center in 1987 that reveals that its PROMIS is not only operating at
the land-based "test facility" in Newport, but is also operational on
board both attack class and "boomer" class submarines.  The Navy,
like the CIA and the NSA, clearly has difficulty in giving a credible
accounting of its PROMIS software.

     The Justice Department continues to try to convince INSLAW,
Congress, the press and the American public that the INSLAW affair
is, at best, a government contract dispute which could have been
resolved long ago if INSLAW had submitted the dispute to the only
forum deemed appropriate by the Justice Department: an Executive
Branch Contract Appeals Board. What the evidence summarized in this
addendum demonstrates, however, is that the essence of the INSLAW
affair is radically different.  The INSLAW affair was a premeditated,
cynical and deceitful taking of INSLAW's software property by the
chief law enforcement agency of the United States without due process
of law and without compensation to INSLAW in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution.




                              ______________




          They [the Hamiltons] don't know squat about how dirty that
          INSLAW deal was.  If they ever find out half of it, they will
          be sickened.

          It is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice than Watergate.

          It is not just the breadth of it, but also the depth of it.  The
          Department of Justice has been compromised at every level.


          -    Statements attributed to a senior Justice Department
               career official by the Chief Investigator of the Senate
               Judiciary Committee in 1988



                              ______________




(Schematic depicting the alleged use of INSLAW's PROMIS Computer Software
Product to satisfy a longstanding need for compatible database software
within the U.S. Intelligence community.)




                                        Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
                                          Individual Agency PROMIS Database -
                                          known internally as FOIMS
                                          (Field Office Information Management
                                          System)

                                        Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)         Individual Agency PROMIS Database

  Master PROMIS Database                White House National Security Council
                                          (NSC)
                                          Individual Agency PROMIS Database
  Primary Telecommunications
  Network for PROMIS Data               National Security Agency (NSA)
  Exchange:  INFO NET                     Individual Agency PROMIS Database

  Alternative Telecommunications
  Networks for PROMIS Data
  Exchange:  Internet
             Use Net




Each Nuclear Submarine allegedly has a copy of the CIA's Master PROMIS
Database in the event of a national emergency.  Each submarine receives
regular updates from the CIA via one of the telecommunications networks.




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